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Would People Behave Differently If They Better Understood
Social Security? Evidence from a Field Experiment †
By Jeffrey B. Liebman and Erzo F. P. Luttmer *
This paper presents the results of a randomized field experiment that
provided information about key Social Security features to older
workers. The experiment was designed to examine whether it is
possible to affect individual behavior using a relatively inexpensive
informational intervention about the provisions of a public program
and to explore the mechanisms underlying the behavior change. We
find that our relatively mild intervention (sending an informational
brochure and an invitation to a web-tutorial) increased labor force
participation one year later by 4 percentage points relative to the
control group mean of 74 percent. (JEL C93, D12, H55)

T

he provisions of government tax, social insurance, and means-tested transfer
programs create complex sets of incentives for individuals making labor supply,
retirement, and savings decisions. If individuals do not understand or do not otherwise
come to correctly perceive the incentives, they may make economic decisions that
are privately suboptimal and may also fail to participate effectively as political actors.1
An important policy question is whether there exist relatively inexpensive
approaches to providing information that improve decision making and ultimately
increase individual well-being. For example, to what extent could a simple brochure
mailed by the Social Security Administration (SSA) correct the widespread misperceptions about the Social Security earnings test? The answer to this question will depend
in part on why incentives are currently misperceived. In some cases, the necessary
information may be straightforward to understand, but expensive (in either monetary or
psychic terms) to acquire. In other cases, the information about program rules may be
readily available, but the calculation necessary to determine an individual’s own incentives may be very complicated. In still other cases, cognitive biases may cause people
* Liebman: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138
(e-mail: jeffrey_liebman@harvard.edu); Luttmer: Department of Economics, Dartmouth College, 6106 Rockefeller
Center, Hanover, NH 03755 (e-mail: erzo.fp.luttmer@dartmouth.edu). We thank Michael Anderson, Dan Benjamin,
John Geanakoplos, Jeffrey Kling, David Laibson, Annamaria Lusardi, Brigitte Madrian, Susann Rohwedder, Mark
Shepard, Stephen Zeldes, several anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Collegio Carlo Alberto, Harvard
University, the NBER Summer Institute, and Stanford University for helpful comments. We thank Jonathan Li, Kate
Mikels, Abdul Tariq, and Victoria Levin for superb research assistance. We thank Michael Anderson for sharing
Stata code on family-wise error rates. This research was supported by the U.S. Social Security Administration
through grant #10-M-98363-1-01 to the National Bureau of Economic Research as part of the SSA Retirement
Research Consortium. The findings and conclusions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not represent
the views of SSA, any agency of the Federal Government, or the NBER. All errors are our own.
†
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disclosure statement(s) or to comment in the online discussion forum.
1
In some cases, these privately suboptimal decisions can be socially optimal. See Liebman and Zeckhauser (2008).
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to misperceive even relatively simple incentive schedules. Finally, powerful social cues
may point people toward a suboptimal decision, even when the correct information
is also readily available. While factors such as these that can produce poor decision
making are well documented, there is little evidence on how easy they are to overcome.
This paper presents the results of a field experiment in which a sample of older
workers was randomized between a treatment group that was given information about
key Social Security provisions, and a control group that was not given the information. One year after the information was provided, we administered a follow-up survey and measured the impact of the information provision on labor supply and Social
Security benefit claiming behavior. We find that our relatively mild intervention
(a mailed brochure combined with an invitation to participate in a 15-minute online
tutorial) raised the fraction of the sample remaining in the labor force by 4 percentage points. This impact is statistically significant for the entire sample and appears to
be driven by female sample members, who increased their labor force participation
by 7 percentage points in response to the treatment. The difference between females
and males in the size of their response to the treatment is not, however, statistically
significant. We do not find statistically significant effects of the treatment on the
probability that respondents have started claiming Social Security benefits.
Because our intervention provided treatment group members with several different
pieces of information about Social Security and also communicated a more general
message that “working additional years is beneficial,” it is impossible to isolate which
aspects of the intervention led to the labor force participation response. Nonetheless,
to explore the mechanisms by which the intervention might have affected behavior,
we ask respondents a series of questions about their understanding of the incentives
that the Social Security program provides for labor supply and benefit claiming. We
find that the information intervention increased the perceived return to working longer, especially among women, which is consistent with a pathway in which the intervention affected behavior by changing knowledge of incentives. However, we do not
have evidence that would allow us to determine whether this pathway was the only
mechanism, or even the primary mechanism, through which the impact occurred.
I. Background

It is becoming increasingly clear that responses of economic actors to the incentives created by government tax and spending programs are affected not only by the
size of the incentives, but also by contextual factors that affect how the incentives are
perceived.2 Duflo et al. (2006) show that customers of a tax preparation firm who
were offered a match of contributions to retirement savings accounts were much
more responsive to the simple and transparent match offer than are US taxpayers
who face a similar match via a provision in the US tax code. Chetty, Looney, and
Kroft (2009) find that changes in excise taxes yield larger behavioral responses than
economically equivalent changes in sales taxes, most likely because the sales taxes
are added at the tax register and are therefore less salient. Kling et al. (2012) posit
2

Bernheim and Rangel (2009) refer to these contextual factors as ancillary conditions.
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that many Medicare beneficiaries are poorly informed about the prices offered by
different prescription drug plans and show that providing information can cause beneficiaries to switch to lower-priced plans. Chetty and Saez (2013) demonstrate that
EITC recipients alter their labor supply when the incentives provided by the program
are explained by a tax preparer, and Song (2013) shows that contribution levels to a
highly subsidized government pension scheme increase by 40 percent among subjects who receive a financial education treatment that emphasizes interest compounding. Mastrobuoni (2011) shows that the mailing of Social Security statements by the
SSA increases knowledge about benefit levels. While Mastrobuoni estimates small
and statistically insignificant impacts on retirement behavior, the 95 percent confidence interval around these estimates is wide and ranges from a 108 percent increase
in the impact of Social Security incentives on retirement to a 66 percent decrease.
The context-specific nature of behavioral responses to incentives increases the
dimensionality of the challenge for researchers seeking to reach a consensus about
the magnitude of behavioral responses to policy provisions, because there will not
be a single parameter that can be averaged across multiple studies if the studies measure behavior in disparate contexts. However, the sensitivity of behavioral responses
to how incentives are perceived by individual decision makers also provides policymakers with an additional instrument; relatively inexpensive interventions that provide information or alter the framing of decisions have the potential to significantly
improve economic well-being.3
Social Security policy is likely to be a particularly fruitful area in which to apply
these insights. Decisions about when to retire and when to claim benefits can have
large implications for well-being over many subsequent years. Such decisions
also have elements of irreversibility that make it hard to undo poor decisions. And
retirement-related decisions are very challenging to get right.4 The Social Security
tax and benefit schedules themselves involve several features that make it hard to
perceive incentives correctly—complex nonlinearities and interactions with other
sources of retirement income that make calculations difficult, a remote connection
between choices and payoffs because benefits are often not received until many
years after the point at which labor supply decisions are made, and a dependence of
one’s own incentives on individual-specific factors, such as marital history and life
expectancy, that make it hard to learn one’s own incentives from that of a peer. In
addition to schedule complexity, these choices involve uncertainty and tradeoffs over
time—the two contexts in which difficulty in decision making have been the most
widely documented.5 Simulations by Benítez-Silva, Demiralp, and Liu (2009) using a
dynamic life-cycle model suggest the potential for large welfare gains from improving
3
In a recent field experiment, Goda, Manchester, and Sojourner (2012) find that a low-cost, direct-mail intervention affects contributions to defined-contribution retirement accounts.
4
There is a large literature on the accuracy of people’s perceptions about future levels of Social Security and
pension benefits and the implications of lack of knowledge on retirement and saving behavior. See Bernheim
(1988); Mitchell (1988); Gustman and Steinmeier (2005a); Rohwedder and Kleinjans (2006); Dominitz, Hung,
and van Soest (2007); and Chan and Huff Stevens (2008). See also Lusardi and Mitchell (2009) for an analysis of
the link between financial literacy and retirement planning.
5
See Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) for a discussion of decision making under complex schedules. See
Beshears et al. (2008) and Liebman and Zeckhauser (2008) for a review of the literature on contexts in which
individuals have difficulties making wise decisions.
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people’s understanding of Social Security. Moreover, experiments have shown effects
of how information about Social Security is presented on hypothetical or intended
behavior—raising the possibility that interventions could also alter actual behavior.6
How people perceive the incentives of Social Security factors critically in several
policy debates. For example, there is no consensus on the extent to which people
correctly perceive the marginal future Social Security benefits they receive when they
work an additional hour.7 Knowing the answer to this question is important for understanding the amount of deadweight loss caused by the OASDI payroll tax and also
for assessing the potential welfare gains from switching to a system—either based
on notional defined-contribution accounts or funded personal retirement accounts—
with more transparent linkage between initial collections and later benefits. Similarly,
there remains no consensus about why so many people retire and claim benefits at
age 62.8 Knowing the answer to this question is important for understanding the
welfare implications for adjusting the earliest eligibility age and the full-benefit age.
In an earlier paper (Liebman and Luttmer 2012), we administered a survey about
Social Security benefit rules to a representative sample of Americans aged 50–70.
We found that the majority of respondents believe that their Social Security benefits
increase with an additional year of work, i.e., that the Social Security benefit rules
provide a positive work incentive. The magnitude of the perceived incentive varies
across respondents, but people generally cite an incentive that is somewhat larger
than our best prediction of this incentive. However, our predictors of the true incentives are not sufficiently precise to rule out moderate over- or under-perceptions of
incentives in the general population or in population subgroups. We also surveyed
people about their understanding of various provisions in the Social Security benefit rules, and found that some of these provisions (e.g., effects of delayed benefit
claiming and rules on widow benefits) are relatively well understood while others
(rules on spousal benefits and provisions on which years of earnings are taken into
account) are less well understood.
In order to achieve the potential welfare gains from improving people’s understanding of the tradeoffs they face, researchers need to make progress in two areas.
The first is in understanding the reasons for current misperceptions. The second is in
testing interventions to discover which approaches are most effective in correcting
misperceptions. Our current study makes three contributions in these areas. First,
it provides further confirmation that interventions affecting people’s perceptions
of incentives can affect individual behavior in important policy contexts. Second,
by measuring both the change in behavior and the change in people’s perceptions,
it provides suggestive evidence regarding how the intervention may have worked
to change behavior. Third, the study demonstrates an approach to altering perceived incentives—a combination of a mailing and an online tutorial—that is both
Hastings and Tejeda-Ashton (2008) show in the context of the privatized Mexican Social Security system that
financially illiterate workers are more price sensitive in their hypothetical choice of retirement fund when fees are
expressed in pesos rather than in terms of annual percentage rates. Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell (forthcoming)
and Liebman and Luttmer (2012) find that the intended age of claiming Social Security benefits depends on how
the early versus late claiming decision is framed.
7
See Liebman, Luttmer, and Seif (2009) for evidence on this subject.
8
Gustman and Steinmeier (2005b) attribute the spike in retirement at age 62 to high discount rates. Cutler et al.
(2013) present evidence that focal point behavior is the main cause of the spike.
6
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r elatively inexpensive and which allows full researcher control over the information
that is provided. In particular, it does not rely on a caseworker-style approach in
which one-on-one counseling is used to influence people. For many applications,
the approach we demonstrate is likely to be scalable to the population level once an
effective intervention is identified. Our approach also removes the ambiguity over
what information or message was provided to the sample member. This ambiguity,
along with cost, is a drawback of the caseworker approach.
II. Survey Design and Experimental Manipulations

A. Population for the Information Intervention
We contracted with Knowledge Networks to administer our experimental intervention and a follow-up survey to a sample drawn from its panel of respondents.
These panelists, originally recruited through random-digit dialing, agree to take a
15–20 minute survey once a week via the Internet using a PC or WebTV in exchange
for free Internet or WebTV access.9 The panelists receive incentive payments and
rewards through a loyalty program. Knowledge Networks collects basic demographic characteristics for all its panelists, and its panelists are roughly representative of the adult US population according to these characteristics.
In 2008, we fielded a baseline survey of knowledge about Social Security using the
Knowledge Network panel (for details see Liebman and Luttmer 2012). The sample
for that survey spanned the ages of 30 to 70, with an oversample of working individuals between the ages of 60 and 65. For the current study, we started with the 3,611
individuals who were invited to participate in our 2008 survey. We dropped 668 individuals who were younger than 55 years old, 419 individuals who were not working
(based on the employment status variable that is part of the Knowledge Networks
standard demographic profile variables), and 41 individuals who told us in the 2008
survey that they were not covered by Social Security. This procedure resulted in an
experimental sample of 2,483 working individuals who were randomized between
the treatment group and the control group. Most of our sample members (90 percent)
were between the ages of 60 and 65 in November 2008. We focus on working individuals near the retirement age because that is the population most likely to display behavioral effects of the information intervention within the time frame of our experiment.
B. Information Intervention
The members of the treatment group received an informational intervention that
consisted of two parts. In February of 2009, Knowledge Networks sent them by regular mail an informational brochure that we had created for this purpose. In March
of 2009, members of the treatment group were invited to participate in a web-tutorial
about Social Security. The completion rate of the web-tutorial was 76.8 percent for
the treatment group as a whole and 91.6 percent for treatment group members who

9

The WebTV option means that individuals did not need to be computer users to be recruited into the panel.
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completed the follow-up survey.10 Members of the control group did not receive any
materials from us (either in the mail or online).
In both the brochure and the web-tutorial, we provided information on three topics.
First, we provided information about longevity to emphasize the need for an adequate
planning horizon for retirement finances. For example, the brochure mentions, “For
the average 65-year-old couple living in America today, there is a 47 percent chance
that at least one spouse will live to age 90.” Second, we explained the relationship
between retirement age and the standard of living during retirement. In particular, we
explain how Social Security benefits rise with the age at which benefits are claimed
and how Social Security benefits depend on a person’s work history. For example,
the web-tutorial introduces a hypothetical worker and shows what happens to this
person’s Social Security benefits if the person works more years. Third, we provide
information about the Social Security earnings test and explain that cuts in current
benefits due to the earnings test are offset by higher benefits in the future. In designing
the information intervention, we took into account that many respondents may have
trouble remembering benefit formulae and information presented with figures and
statistics. We therefore complemented such information with vignettes about actual
retirees whom we had interviewed and from whom we had received permission to
incorporate their information in our materials. These vignettes helped to underline the
broader message of the intervention and contribute to the “gestalt” of the message.
Before giving information about Social Security in the brochure, we explained that
the brochure was sent to them by Knowledge Networks on behalf of us (“researchers at Harvard University”) as a follow-up to a recent survey that the individual had
been invited to take (our 2008 baseline survey). Moreover, we emphasized that the
brochure was not a comprehensive source of Social Security facts, and we provided
phone numbers and links to additional sources of information about Social Security.
We printed the brochure on glossy paper, used a relatively large font, and provided
it with a professional layout in color in order to entice respondents to read it. The
complete brochure is included in online Appendix A.
The web-tutorial covered the same three basic topics as the brochure, but was tailored to each respondent’s situation—something we were able to do because it was
administered online. For example, we gave information about the typical longevity
of people of the same sex as the respondent; the characters in examples had the same
sex as the respondent, and returns to delaying claiming were calculated exactly
based on the respondent’s birth cohort. The web-tutorial also contained a number
of questions about the information we presented in order to induce the respondents
to pay attention to the information. In the web-tutorial, as in the mailed brochure,
we emphasized the gestalt of the information intervention by including vignettes of
actual retirees. For example, the tutorial contained the following vignette:
“Among those nearing retirement age, it’s common to worry about future
finances, and for good reason: retirees must grapple with the reality of paying for
living expenses for years to come. However, with a bit of planning, retirees can live
comfortably well beyond retirement age. The following is a story about 91-year-old
10
As we explain below, some sample members were no longer active with Knowledge Networks at the time the
invitations to participate in the web-tutorial were sent out.
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Leon, who says, ‘I’m the other side of 91.’ [Picture of Leon is shown] Leon worked
as a chemistry teacher for 26 years before retiring at age 70. Each year, he put aside
the maximum amount out of his paycheck toward his pension. He also knew that
waiting until age 70 to claim Social Security would increase his monthly benefits.
Leon says that his current financial situation is ‘better than I’ve ever had. Between
my pension and Social Security...I don’t worry about anything.’ According to Leon,
people approaching retirement should continue to work as long as they’re healthy.”
At the end of the web-tutorial, we provided phone numbers and Internet links to
further resources for information about Social Security. The complete web-tutorial
is included in online Appendix B.11
C. Follow-Up Survey
In April 2010, 13 months after the information intervention, members from both
the treatment group and the control group were invited to participate in our follow-up
survey. The follow-up survey was designed to measure the effects of the information
intervention on labor supply and Social Security benefit claiming behavior. In order
to explore what mechanisms underlie the behavior change, it also included questions
intended to measure understanding of the incentives that the Social Security program
provides for labor supply and benefit claiming. In addition, because one year is a
relatively short period in which to observe changes in retirement behavior, the survey also contained questions about planned future behavior. The follow-up survey
contained 67 questions and the median time to complete it was 18 minutes. We paid
respondents a $5 incentive for completing the survey. Inactive panelists were offered
an additional $5 to return to the panel to take the survey.12 The follow-up survey was
fielded between April 8 and June 9 of 2010. While the vast majority (88.5 percent) of
respondents completed the survey in April, we kept the survey open until June to maximize the response rate. The full survey instrument is provided in online Appendix C.
Of the 2,483 members of the experimental sample, 1,596 completed the follow-up
survey for an overall response rate of 64.3 percent. Online Appendix Figure A1 contains a flow chart describing the evolution of our analysis sample. It shows that attrition from the experimental sample occurred in three steps and that most of it appears
to have been for reasons unrelated to the intervention. Online Appendix Figure A2
shows a timeline for the different stages of data collection.
First, only 89 percent of experimental sample members were invited to take
the follow-up survey because 11.4 percent of the sample had permanently left the
Knowledge Networks panel or had informed Knowledge Networks that they were
temporarily unavailable for surveys. The attrition rate at this first step was similar
between the treatment group (11.0 percent) and control group (11.7 percent).
11
There is little overlap between the information provided in our survey and the information provided in the
Social Security statement that was being mailed annually to workers at the time of our survey. The 35-year rule is
not mentioned in the Social Security statement, and the statement says only that future benefits “could” increase if
you are affected by the earnings test.
12
Panelists can become “inactive” either by voluntarily withdrawing from the panel or by being retired from the
regular panel by Knowledge Networks. However, Knowledge Networks retains the possibility of inviting inactive
members for particular surveys, e.g., for surveys that involve a longitudinal dimension.
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Second, not all sample members who were invited to take the survey clicked
on the link to learn the topic of the survey. In particular, 78.3 percent of invited
treatment group members and 74.2 percent of invited control group members
clicked on the link. The particular way in which invitations to take the follow-up
survey were extended minimized the opportunity for treatment-induced differential
non-response between the treatment and control groups. As is typical of Knowledge
Network survey invitations, the invitation simply invited sample members to take a
survey—without specifying the subject of the survey—and provided a link to click
on if the sample member wanted to participate. Moreover, the overwhelming majority (86 percent) of invited sample members who failed to click on the link had been
identified by Knowledge Networks as inactive panelists prior to the date of our survey invitation. Thus over 90 percent of the combined attrition that occurred in these
first and second steps occurred because of respondents who were no longer actively
participating in Knowledge Networks surveys, rather than from a decision to skip
our particular survey.
Third, conditional on clicking on the link and thereby learning the topic of the
survey, 3.8 percent of treatment group members and 4.0 percent of control group
members failed to complete the survey.13 Conditional on completing the survey, the
item-response rates were very high, generally well above 95 percent.
In forming our analysis sample, we drop one observation of a sample member for
whom the age according the Knowledge Network profile variable increased by three
years between November 2008 and April 2010, which is logically impossible. This
yields a final sample of 1,595 observations for our main analyses.
D. Analysis of Attrition Patterns
Despite the blinded nature of the survey invitation, the overall response rate to the
follow-up survey was 4.4 percentage points higher in the treatment group than the
control group, and this difference is significant at the 5 percent level. As described
above, this difference can be explained by the fact that members of the treatment
group were more likely to still be active Knowledge Networks panelists at the April
first date of the survey invitation. Among panelists active as of the invitation date,
the response rates for the treatment group and for the control group were not significantly different from each other. And nearly all of the differential attrition occurred
before sample members were aware of the survey topic. Thus, the differential
response rate is unrelated to the topic or content of the follow-up survey.
The concern, of course, is that the attrition process may not be random and may
result in treatment and control populations that would no longer have the same
expected outcomes if they received the same treatment. To explore this issue, we
examined whether the demographic characteristics of the treatment and control
groups differ among takers of the follow-up survey. These results are presented in
online Appendix Table A2. Panel A tests whether these demographic characteristics
are jointly statistically different between the two groups by regressing treatment
13
An additional 1 percent of respondents in each group was skipped out of the survey early in administration
once screening questions revealed that they were not eligible for Social Security.
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status on the full set of demographics listed in panel B. Consistent with successful
random assignment and no differential attribution by demographics, the full set of
demographics is jointly insignificant (p-value 0.759). Panel B shows that the samples are well balanced on the individual demographic variables as well. Only 1 of
35 pairwise comparisons has a p-value below 0.05. We, nevertheless, control for
baseline demographics in our regressions in order to increase the statistical precision of treatment effect estimates and to adjust for any random differences between
the treatment and control groups in observable characteristics.
Even though the treatment and control groups are balanced on observable demographics, it is possible that they differ on some unobserved characteristics. This
would be particularly worrisome if something about the treatment caused treatment
groups members to be more willing to take the survey in a way that directly affected
the mean of the outcome variable. For example, if treatment group members who
were working were more inclined to answer the survey because they were proud to
exhibit behavior that was consistent with the general message of the intervention,
then our results could be biased toward finding a positive impact of the intervention on labor supply. However, as we noted above, the differential attrition occurred
before respondents were aware of the survey topic, so we can rule out this sort of
mechanism.14
With direct channels between survey participation and treatment group/outcome
status ruled out, it is very unlikely that a 4 percent difference in response rates could
bias the results in a meaningful way. Indeed, we can bound the potential bias. Under
the extreme assumption that all of the extra response in the treatment group was
made up of people who were employed, this differential response would account for
less than half of the estimated overall employment impact and less than one quarter
of the impact among women.15
In summary, while we cannot completely rule out bias due to the differential
attrition, there is no evidence in the data to suggest lack of balance between the
treatment and control groups, the blinded nature of the survey invitation rules out
some of the most troublesome types of attrition bias, and the magnitude of the differential attrition is small enough that it would take a very extreme attrition process
to significantly alter the findings of this paper.16

14
In theory, the information intervention could have affected panelist decisions about whether to remain active
with Knowledge Networks. Given that panelists take weekly surveys, it is highly unlikely that our survey (out of the
50 or so that a typical panelist would have taken during a year) would have had a quantitatively significant impact
on the decision to remain active. It is also conceivable that by affecting the probability of work, the intervention
affected the availability of time to take surveys. However, this mechanism would lead to lower participation by
those in the treatment group, which is the opposite of what we find.
15
These calculations are performed as follows. The control group mean employment rate was 74.4 percent
(Table 3). The control group response rate was 62.0 percent and the treatment group response rate was 66.4 percent
(the differential response was 4.4 percentage points). If there were no true treatment effect but all the extra response
in the treatment group consisted of working individuals, then the treatment group mean employment rate would
have been (0.620 × 0.744 + 0.044 × 1.00)/0.664 = 0.761or an impact of 1.7 percent relative to 74.4 percent. The
upper bound of 1.7 percent is well below half of the 4.2 percent overall employment estimate.
16
The differential attrition rates were similar among males (4 percent) and females (5 percent). If differential
attrition were responsible for a significant portion of the estimated impact of the intervention, we would expect to see
employment rate effects for both males and females. Instead, the employment effects are concentrated among females.
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Table 1—Summary Statistics
Women

Men

N

Mean

SD

Key outcome variables
Did paid work last month (2010)
Hours worked for pay last month (2010)
Earnings last month (2010), in dollars/month
Not receiving Social Security benefits in 2010
(Asked if not claiming in 2008 and aged 60+ in 2010)

880
879
873
686

0.75
91
2,888
0.70

0.43
76
4,998
0.46

Non-Hispanic white
Non-Hispanic black
Other race/ethnicity

883
883
883

0.88
0.06
0.06

High school dropout
High school
Some college
Bachelor’s degree or more

883
883
883
883

Married
Widowed
Divorced
Separated
Never married
Living apart

N

Mean

SD

p-value on
t-test of
difference

712
0.79
0.41
712
109
79
703 4,248 5,777
587
0.72
0.45

0.088
0.000
0.000
0.261

2.2

712

2.2

0.419

0.32
0.23
0.24

712
712
712

0.90
0.03
0.07

0.30
0.18
0.25

0.257
0.034
0.749

0.02
0.18
0.33
0.47

0.13
0.39
0.47
0.50

712
712
712
712

0.01
0.10
0.32
0.57

0.11
0.30
0.47
0.50

0.328
0.000
0.582
0.000

883
883
883
883
883
883

0.55
0.07
0.27
0.01
0.06
0.03

0.50
0.26
0.44
0.09
0.25
0.18

712
712
712
712
712
712

0.78
0.02
0.11
0.01
0.05
0.03

0.41
0.14
0.31
0.09
0.22
0.18

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.892
0.344
0.977

Lives in the Northeast
Lives in the Midwest
Lives in the South
Lives in the West

883
883
883
883

0.20
0.26
0.28
0.26

0.40
0.44
0.45
0.44

712
712
712
712

0.17
0.25
0.32
0.26

0.37
0.43
0.47
0.44

0.137
0.511
0.078
0.913

Household size of one
Household size of two
Household size of three or more

883
883
883

0.35
0.49
0.16

0.48
0.50
0.37

712
712
712

0.21
0.57
0.22

0.41
0.50
0.41

0.000
0.001
0.005

Household income: less than 25k
Household income: 25k–50k
Household income: 50k–75k
Household income: 75k–100k
Household income: 100k or more

883
883
883
883
883

0.09
0.25
0.25
0.21
0.20

0.28
0.44
0.43
0.41
0.40

712
712
712
712
712

0.05
0.15
0.22
0.19
0.39

0.21
0.35
0.42
0.40
0.49

0.002
0.000
0.167
0.437
0.000

Demographics measured at the time of the baseline survey (2008)
Age in 2010
883

63.2

63.1

Notes: Key outcome variables are measured in the April–June 2010 Social Security Follow-Up Survey, designed by
the authors and fielded by Knowledge Networks. The baseline demographics are the values in the standard demographic profile variables at the time of the baseline survey (November 2008). The standard demographic profile is
collected by Knowledge Networks. Our sample is restricted to individuals working in November 2008 and heavily
oversamples individuals between the ages of 60 and 65 as of November 2008.

III. Results

A. Sample Characteristics
Table 1 shows the demographic composition of the sample that completed the follow-up survey. We split the table by the gender of the respondent because labor market responses often differ by gender. About three quarters of the sample performed
paid work in the calendar month previous to the follow-up survey, and this fraction is
only slightly lower for women. The labor force participation rate may seem high for
this age group, but recall that only individuals who were working in 2008 were eligible to participate in the experiment. Overall, about 40 percent of sample members
were receiving Social Security benefits in 2010, which implies that a non-negligible
fraction was combining work and benefit receipt. Of those who did not receive
benefits in 2008 but were potentially eligible to receive Social Security benefits in
2010, 30 percent of women and 28 percent of men were receiving benefits.
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We present the demographic characteristics of sample members at the time of the
baseline survey (2008) because the regressions control for demographics as measured in 2008. We include the 2008 controls rather than the 2010 controls in the
regressions because the treatment could conceivably affect some of the control variables in 2010. The specific controls that we present and use in regressions are maintained by Knowledge Networks and are therefore available for all sample members,
even those who did not participate in the 2008 survey. Knowledge Networks recruits
its panelists such that the demographic characteristics of its panelists are broadly
representative of those in the US adult population. However, because we conditioned our sample on the respondent being in a narrow age range (90 percent of our
panel is between 60 and 65 in November 2008) and on the respondent working in
2008, the demographic characteristics of our sample are not representative of the
general population but instead are broadly representative of working individuals
approaching the age at which most people are making retirement decisions.17
The mean age in our sample in 2010 is 63. About 89 percent of the sample is
white, and about 84 percent has at least some college education. These percentages
would be high for the general population in our age group, but recall that our sample
is limited to working individuals. About 55 percent of the female respondents are
married as are about 78 percent of the men. This difference is mostly accounted for
by the fact that working women in this age range are much more likely to be divorced
than are working men. The sample is geographically dispersed, with all regions
of the country well represented. About 80 percent of respondents live in one- or
two-person households. Finally, respondents come from households throughout the
income distribution, though higher-income households are disproportionately represented because of the higher-than-average labor market participation in our sample.
B. Manipulation Checks
To verify that our experimental manipulation was effective and was implemented
correctly, we asked two questions about the information intervention to all respondents at the end of the follow-up survey. We first asked them whether they recalled
receiving “about a year ago … the following informational brochure” about Social
Security rules, showing them a picture of the front page of our informational brochure on the screen. We then asked them whether they recalled participating “about

17
Online Appendix Table A1 examines the representativeness of the experimental sample by comparing its
demographic characteristics to those of observations in the Current Population Survey (CPS) that match our sample
selection criteria of working and being between the ages of 60 and 65. Relative to the CPS, our experimental sample
has somewhat more whites (85 percent versus 81 percent), is more educated (47 percent with a bachelor’s versus
37 percent), is slightly less likely to be married (64 percent versus 70 percent), and has somewhat lower incomes
(46 percent with annual incomes exceeding $75,000 versus 51 percent). While many of the demographic characteristics are statistically significantly different between the CPS sample and the experimental sample, the economic
magnitude of these differences is moderate in size. We therefore think of the sample as broadly representative of the
US population of working individuals between the ages of 60 and 65. In terms of demographic characteristics, the
1,595 respondents to the follow-up survey look very similar to the 2,483 individuals of the experimental sample,
with the exception that respondents to the follow-up survey are 3.8 percentage points more likely to be white and
4.5 percentage points more likely to have a bachelor’s degree. Overall, our survey sample is quite similar to our
full experimental sample and, as we discussed earlier, there is no statistically significant demographic difference
between the treatment group and the control group in the survey sample.
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Table 2—Manipulation Checks

Dependent variable
1. Recall receiving our
brochure about SS
2. Recall taking our
web-tutorial on SS

Entire sample

Female respondents

Male respondents

Control Treatment
mean
effect
[N of reg.]
(SE)
(1)
(2)

Control Treatment
mean
effect
[N of reg.]
(SE)
(3)
(4)

Control Treatment
mean
effect
[N of reg.]
(SE)
(5)
(6)

0.048
[1,595]

0.286***
(0.018)

0.010
[1,595]

0.084***
(0.011)

0.040
[883]

0.307***
(0.024)

0.012
[883]

0.083***
(0.015)

0.059
[712]

0.256***
(0.027)

0.009
[712]

0.082***
(0.016)

p-value on
t-test
of
difference
(7)
0.761

0.993

Notes: Robust standard errors between parentheses. Number of observations in the regression sample in square
brackets. Treatment effects are estimated by an OLS regression with controls for age and age squared as well as
demographics measured at the time of the baseline survey. The demographic control variables, measured at the
time of the baseline survey, consist of gender, race/ethnicity dummies (non-hispanic white, non-hispanic black,
other race/ethnicity), education dummies (high school dropout, high school graduate, some college, college plus),
marital status dummies (married, widowed, divorced, separated, never married, living apart), regional dummies
(Northeast, Midwest, South, West), and household size dummies (one-person, two-person, 3+ person household).
See online Appendix C for the exact wording of the questions that define the outcome variables: Q8.4 and Q8.5.
Column 7 reports the p-value on the test of the hypothesis that treatment effects are equal for females and males.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

a year ago … in an online module that provided additional information about Social
Security rules, and which was tailored to each person’s individual information.”
We further told the respondents, “To help you remember this survey from the many
other surveys you have taken, the online module contained stories about the experiences of two retirees, 91-year-old Leon and 66-year-old Elena,” and showed them
the same pictures of these two retirees as they had seen in the online module.
The first row of Table 2 presents the results for the recall rate of the brochure. The
first column shows that 4.8 percent of sample members in the control group report
receiving the brochure, even though they should not have received, and to the best
of our knowledge did not receive, the brochure. We believe this 4.8 percent may
have confused our brochure with other mailings they have received about Social
Security. The second column shows that the recall rate is 28.6 percentage points
higher for respondents in the treatment group than for those in the control group,
and that this effect is highly significant.18 For consistency with the other regressions
in the paper, the treatment effect is estimated in an OLS regression of the outcome
variable (recall of the brochure) on an indicator of belonging to the treatment group
and a set of demographic controls, including a quadratic in age. The estimate is
extremely similar if the demographic controls are omitted. The significant treatment
effect on the brochure recall rate is reassuring in that it shows that our treatment had
an impact on the respondents and appears to have been implemented correctly. Yet,
even in the treatment group, the recall rate is only 33.4 percent. In other words, a
majority of respondents in the treatment group do not recall receiving the brochure,
even though they should all have received it. Because it is possible to be influenced
18
Our finding that a significant fraction of sample members recall a mailing about Social Security is consistent
with the Mastrobuoni (2011) finding that the annual mailing of Social Security benefit statements affects expectations of future benefit levels.
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by information without recalling where or when one received the information, we
do not believe the treatment effects on other outcome variables should be scaled up
by the reciprocal of the treatment effect on recall. We therefore do not treat the recall
rate as a first-stage regression for estimating a treatment-on-the-treated effect.
Columns 3 and 4 show the control group recall rate and the treatment effect for
female respondents while columns 5 and 6 show these estimates for male respondents. Although the treatment effect is slightly larger for female respondents than for
male respondents, this difference is not statistically significant, as column 7 indicates.
The second row of Table 2 shows the results for the recall rate of participating in
the web tutorial on Social Security. While only 1.0 percent incorrectly recalls taking part in this tutorial, the treatment effect is only 8.4 percentage points. Though
this estimate is highly statistically significant, it implies that merely 9.4 percent
of respondents in the treatment group recall participating in the web tutorial. We
know that 77 percent of individuals in the treatment group in fact participated in the
web tutorial, and even among the participants the recall rate is only 10.2 percent.
We surmise that the low treatment effect on recall of the web tutorial is related to
the fact that the respondents take online surveys from Knowledge Networks quite
frequently (typically a couple per month), and it is hard for them to recall with confidence based on the relatively limited information we provided them whether they
took our specific web tutorial. It is also possible that because this question was asked
at the end of the survey, respondents may have feared follow-up questions if they
answered “yes.” The remaining columns of row 2 show that the treatment effect on
recall of the web tutorial is very similar for women and men.
C. Impacts of the Intervention on Labor Supply and Benefit Claiming Behavior
The experiment was designed to investigate the effect of better knowledge about
the Social Security benefit rules on (i) labor supply and (ii) Social Security claiming
behavior. The first three rows of panel A of Table 3 present the effects on labor supply; the final row of panel A contains the results for claiming behavior.
Our simplest measure of labor supply is the answer to the question whether the
respondent performed any paid work in the previous calendar month (generally
March 2010). In the control group, 74.4 percent of respondents worked in the previous month. This percentage may seem surprisingly high at first, but recall again that
only individuals who were working in 2008 were included in the experiment. The
information intervention increased this percentage by 4.2 percentage points, and
this effect is significant at the 5 percent level. The estimate of the treatment effect
is especially large in the female subsample. Female respondents are 7.2 percentage points more likely to work if they received the information intervention, while
male respondents in the treatment group are a statistically insignificant 0.3 percentage points more likely to work. However, the male-female difference is not statistically significant (p-value of 0.102). Hence, we cannot rule out that the labor supply
response to our intervention was the same for women and men.
We also measured labor supply by hours worked in the previous calendar month
and own earnings in the previous calendar month. Consistent with our finding that
labor force participation increased, we find positive point estimates for the effect of
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Table 3—Treatment Effects on Behavior
Entire sample

Dependent variable

Control
mean
[N of reg.]
(1)

Panel A. Primary outcome measures
1. Did paid work last
0.744
month (2010)
[1,592]

Treatment
effect
(SE)
(2)
0.042**
(0.021)

2. Hours worked for
pay last month (2010)

97.7
[1,591]
3,258
[1,576]

388
(263)

4. Not receiving Social Security
benefits in 2010

0.719
[1,273]

3. Earnings last month
(2010), in
dollars/month

(asked if not claiming
in ‘08 and aged 60+ in ‘10)

Panel B. Indices of outcome measures
5. Index of labor market
1.000
 outcomes (standardized
[1,592]
average of standardized
values of (1), (2), and (3))

6. Index of all key outcomes
(standardized average of
standardized values of (1),
(2), (3), and (4))

1.000
[1,595]

2.8
(3.8)

Female respondents
Control
mean
[N of reg.]
(3)
0.713
[880]

88.6
[879]

Treatment
effect
(SE)
(4)
0.072**
(0.029)

4.8
(5.1)

2,554
[873]

683**
(336)

−0.006
(0.023)

0.715
[686]

−0.032
(0.032)

0.082*
(0.049)

1.000
[880]

0.064
(0.048)

1.000
[883]

Male respondents
Control
mean
[N of reg.]
(5)
0.783
[712]

108.9
[712]

Treatment
effect
(SE)
(6)
0.003
(0.031)

1.4
(5.9)

p-value
on t-test
of
difference
(7)
0.102
0.659

4,146
[703]

168
(443)

0.354

0.724
[587]

0.023
(0.032)

0.227

0.154**
(0.068)

1.000
[712]

0.017
(0.075)

0.174

0.119*
(0.066)

1.000
[712]

0.072
(0.073)

0.637

Notes: Robust standard errors between parentheses. Number of observations in the regression sample in square
brackets. The entire sample consists of 1,595 observations (883 females, 712 males), but some regressions may
have smaller samples because of item nonresponse. The sample size for row 4 is 1,273 rather than 1,595 because
we excluded 322 observations that were already claiming benefits in 2008 or were younger than 60 in 2010. These
observations were excluded because the information treatment could not have possibly affected their claim status in
2010. The indices in rows 5 and 6 are standardized by the control group mean and standard deviation of the sample
listed in the column. Treatment effects are estimated by an OLS regression with controls for age and age squared as
well as demographics measured at the time of the baseline survey. See the note to Table 2 for a description of these
demographic control variables. See online Appendix C for the exact wording of the questions that define the four
outcome variables: Q1.13, Q1.16, Q1.17, and Q1.2, respectively. Column 7 reports the p-value on the test of the
hypothesis that treatment effects are equal for females and males.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

the information intervention on hours worked and earnings, but only the estimate on
earnings for female respondents is significant at the 5 percent level. The dispersion
across respondents in hours worked and earnings is relatively high, which increases
standard errors relative to the mean value of the variable, and which makes it more
difficult to detect a statistically significant effect. For example, the treatment effect
for the participation variable needs to exceed only 5.6 percent of the control group
mean in order for it to be statistically significant. For the hours and earnings variables, however, it needs to reach at least 7.7 percent and 15.8 percent of the control
group mean, respectively, to attain statistical significance.
It is not the case that the information intervention primarily induced labor force
participation at only very minimal hours or earnings. If we redefine labor force
participation to include just individuals who work at least 20 hours per month,
we continue to find significant effects of the information treatment on labor force
participation in the entire sample and in the subsample of female respondents. If
we redefine labor force participation to include only individuals with at least $500
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in monthly earnings, we continue to find significant effects of the information
treatment on female labor force participation, though the effect for the entire sample
is not statistically significant (p-value 0.110).
The final row of panel A of Table 3 shows results regarding the claiming of
Social Security benefits. The sample is smaller than that for the labor supply results
because we measured benefit claiming only among those who were 60 and older but
not claiming benefits at the time of our baseline survey (November 2008). The table
shows that just over 70 percent of those who were 60 or older but not claiming benefits at the time of our baseline survey have not yet started claiming Social Security
benefits by the time of the follow-up survey (April/May 2010). The information
treatment did not have a significant effect on this percentage.
The presence of multiple outcome measures increases the risk that some of them
are statistically significant by chance even if in truth there is no treatment effect. We
address this multiple inference problem in two ways. First, we reduce the number of
outcome variables by creating summary indices, an approach that originated in biostatistics (O’Brien 1984). Second, we calculate p-values that are adjusted for the multiple
inference problem using the Westfall and Young (1993) free stepdown resampling algorithm. Both approaches are increasingly used in economics (e.g., Kling, Liebman, and
Katz 2007; Acemoglu and Finkelstein 2008; Anderson 2008; and Heckman et al. 2010).
In panel B of Table 3, we present indices of the primary outcome measures.
Because claiming behavior is conceptually different from labor supply, we created
two indices: one of the three labor supply measures, and one that combines the labor
supply measures with claiming behavior. We construct the indices by first standardizing each of the primary outcome variables by the control group mean and variance,
then taking a simple average of the non-missing values of the standardized variables,
and finally standardizing the average by the control group mean and variance. Thus,
the index measures effect sizes in terms of standard deviations of the control group.
Row 5 presents the index of labor supply outcomes, and shows that the information treatment increased labor supply in the entire sample by 8.2 percent of a
control-group standard deviation, but that this effect is only marginally statistically
significant. As before, the labor supply effect is most pronounced in the female
subsample, where the effect is larger in magnitude (15.4 percent of a control-group
standard deviation) and statistically significant. Thus, when we eliminate the multiple inference problem of having three labor supply outcome measures by creating
a single labor supply index, we still find a significant labor supply response to the
treatment among females. In row 6, we also include Social Security claiming as a
component of the index. Not surprisingly, this weakens the results because we found
no treatment effects on claiming behavior, but we still find a marginally significant
effect on the index of all four outcome variables for females ( p-value 0.071).
The second way of accounting for the multiple inference problem is to calculate
the probability that at least one hypothesis out of a family of hypotheses is falsely
rejected. This probability is the family-wise error rate (FWER). We calculate the
FWER using the Westfall and Young (1993) free stepdown resampling algorithm.19
19

We use 100,000 replications.
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When the family of hypotheses consists of all four primary outcome measures equaling zero, only the treatment effect on female labor force participation is statistically
significant (FWER-adjusted p-value of 0.046). This implies that the treatment effect
on female labor force participation remains significant even after accounting for the
fact that we tested for a treatment effect in four outcome measures. Alternatively,
one can control for the family-wise error rate by considering a family of two hypotheses: no treatment effect on the index of the three labor supply measures and no
treatment effect on claiming behavior. In this case, the treatment effect on the index
of labor supply measures remains significant for females (FWER-adjusted p-value
of 0.045). Overall, we conclude from panel B of Table 3 and the calculations of the
FWER-adjusted p-values that the significant treatment effect on female labor supply
holds up after accounting for the multiple inference problem.
Table 4 examines the robustness of the estimates in Table 3 to two alternative
specifications: (i) the omission of control variables and (ii) a probit regression for
binary outcome variables and a median regression for continuous outcome variables. Table 4 shows that the key findings of Table 3 are robust. The treatment effect
on female labor force participation remains statistically significant and similar in
magnitude for all specifications. Similar to the findings in Table 3, the estimated
effects on hours and earnings are positive and consistent in magnitude with the
increase in labor force participation, but only occasionally statistically significant.
Also in line with the findings of Table 3, we never detect a significant effect of our
treatment on Social Security claiming behavior.
IV. Understanding the Results

This section contains additional analysis and discussion of the results, with a
focus on three questions: (i) what aspects of the intervention led to the behavioral
responses; (ii) why do the experimental impacts appear to be concentrated among
female sample members; and (iii) whether we would expect to see additional behavioral responses if we were able to measure outcomes after more time has passed.
A. Which Aspects of the Intervention Led to the Behavioral Response?
In designing this project, we and others we consulted with had significant doubts
about whether the relatively mild intervention that was feasible given our resources
could affect understanding about Social Security and alter behavior.20 We were particularly concerned that if we tested too weak an intervention and found no impact,
we would have learned little—since it would always be possible that a slightly stronger intervention would have had an impact. We therefore decided to combine several
different approaches to providing information in order to maximize the strength
of the intervention. Specifically, we offered each treatment-group sample member
both an informational mailing and an online tutorial. Within each intervention, we
20
Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) similarly caution that one should not expect meaningful impacts from one-time
financial literacy interventions—not because the financial education is ineffective per se but because the “cure” is
likely to be inadequate.
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Table 4—Robustness of Treatment Effects on Behavior

Dependent variable

Entire sample

Female respondents

Male respondents

Control Treatment
mean
effect
[N of reg.] (SE)
(1)
(2)

Control Treatment
mean
effect
[N of reg.]
(SE)
(3)
(4)

Control Treatment
mean
effect
[N of reg.]
(SE)
(5)
(6)

Panel A. Did paid work last month (2010)
1. Baseline
0.744
(row 1 of Table 3)
[1,592]
2. No controls
0.744
[1,592]
3. Probit
0.744
[1,592]

0.042**
(0.021)
0.040*
(0.021)
0.041*
(0.021)

0.713
[880]
0.713
[880]
0.713
[880]

Panel B. Hours worked for pay last month (2010)
4. Baseline
97.7
2.8
(row 2 of Table 3)
[1,591]
(3.8)
5. No controls
97.7
3.0
[1,591]
(3.9)
6. Median regression
97.7
0.0
[1,591] (10.6)

88.6
[879]
88.6
[879]
88.6
[879]

Panel C. Earnings last month (2010), in dollars/month
7. Baseline
3,258
388
(row 3 of Table 3)
[1,576]
(263)
8. No controls
3,258
454*
[1,576]
(271)
9. Median regression
3,258
500**
[1,576]
(226)

2,554
[873]
2,554
[873]
2,554
[873]

0.072**
(0.029)
0.069**
(0.029)
0.073**
(0.030)
4.8
(5.1)
4.6
(5.1)
20.0
(14.9)
683**
(336)
646*
(336)
375
(249)

0.783
[712]
0.783
[712]
0.783
[712]
108.9
[712]
108.9
[712]
108.9
[712]
4,146
[703]
4,146
[703]
4,146
[703]

0.003
(0.031)
0.004
(0.031)
0.001
(0.031)
1.4
(5.9)
0.9
(5.9)
0.0
(13.8)
168
(443)
193
(437)
0
(424)

p-value
on t-test
of
difference
(7)
0.102
0.124
0.089*

0.659
0.629
0.325

0.354
0.412
0.446

Panel D. Not receiving Social Security benefits in 2010 (asked if not claiming in 2008 and 60 or older in 2010)
10. Baseline
0.719 −0.006
0.715 −0.032
0.724
0.023
0.227
  (row 4 of Table 3)
[1,273]
(0.023)
[686]
(0.032)
[587]
(0.032)
11. No controls
0.719 −0.019
0.715 −0.037
0.724
0.001
0.461
[1,273]
(0.025)
[686]
(0.035)
[587]
(0.037)
12. Probit
0.719 −0.011
0.715 −0.037
0.724
0.020
0.280
[1,273]
(0.027)
[686]
(0.037)
[587]
(0.038)
13. Including
0.619
0.001
0.601 −0.019
0.642
0.032
0.219
   observations under
[1,595]
(0.021)
[883]
(0.028)
[712]
(0.031)
   60 or that were already
   claiming SS in 2008
Notes: Robust standard errors between parentheses. Number of observations in the regression sample in square
brackets. The entire sample consists of 1,595 observations (883 females, 712 males), but some regressions may
have smaller samples because of item nonresponse. The sample size for rows 10–12 is 1,273 rather than 1,595
because we excluded 322 observations that were already claiming benefits in 2008 or were younger than 60 in 2010.
These observations were excluded because the information treatment could not have possibly affected their claim
status in 2010. Treatment effects are estimated by regressions that control for age and age squared as well as demographics measured at the time of the baseline survey. See the note to Table 2 for a description of these demographic
control variables. The baseline specification is an OLS regression. The Probit specification reports marginal effects.
See online Appendix C for the exact wording of the questions that define the outcome variables: Q1.13, Q1.16,
Q1.17, and Q1.2, respectively. Column 7 reports the p-value on the test of the hypothesis that treatment effects are
equal for females and males.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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c ombined specific information about Social Security rules, more general information about the importance of taking steps to ensure adequate income during retirement, and vignettes in which actual retirees discussed their own experiences in ways
that reinforced the more specific information.
The multi-faceted treatment raises the question of which aspects of the intervention led to the behavioral responses. Knowing the answer to this question is relevant if one were thinking of scaling up this intervention or of applying this finding
to another policy domain. Would a mailing alone be sufficient? Was the specific
knowledge about the program essential, or are vignettes the best way to communicate information in a salient manner? Are there interaction effects from presenting
information in multiple ways?
Knowing the answers to these questions is important not only for learning how
to scale up interventions at the least cost, but also for drawing normative policy
recommendations from the findings. In particular, if the behavioral impact comes
about because people now understand the program better and therefore make better
decisions, then the normative implications are clear—we have made sample members better off by providing them with information. In contrast, if the intervention
had its effect because it communicated an overall message of “continuing to work
until older ages has benefits,” then the normative implications are more complex;
such an intervention could persuade people to continue to work for whom it is not
optimal to do so.21
While our multifaceted intervention does not provide us with the ability to isolate
the specific mechanisms that produced the labor supply impacts, we did ask questions to explore whether the intervention changed the amount of knowledge sample
members had about different aspects of Social Security. Specifically, we examined
the effects on knowledge about three main topics on which the information intervention focused: the likelihood that retirees live into their 90s, the effects of working
longer and claiming later on Social Security benefits, and the earnings test.
Here we summarize the main findings. In the interest of space, we focus on the statistically significant findings in Table 5, but the full set of results is available in online
Appendix Table A3. Further details are available in Liebman and Luttmer (2011).
The intervention did not significantly affect knowledge about longevity or the
earnings test. It also did not significantly affect knowledge about Social Security benefits increasing with years worked or the percent increase in benefits per additional
year worked. However, when we asked about work incentives in a more intuitive
way (“Do you get a better deal or worse deal from Social Security if you work more
years?”), we find that the intervention raised the fraction of the sample reporting that
one gets a better deal from working more years by 4.3 percentage points from a base
of 36.3 percent ( p-value: 0.082). This effect is especially p ronounced for female
respondents, for whom the information treatment increases the fraction perceiving
21
Because our information delivery mechanism, unlike the caseworker approach, allows for complete researcher
control over what information is provided, it would in theory be straightforward to do follow-up experiments to
determine which components of the intervention are necessary to produce the behavioral response we observed.
One would simply randomize people into different treatments each containing different subsets of the experimental
intervention. In practice, one would have to be selective since sample size considerations would limit the number of
different permutations that could be tested.
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Table 5—Selected Treatment Effects on Knowledge about Social Security
and on Expected Future Behavior

Dependent variable

Entire sample

Female respondents

Male respondents

Control Treatment
mean
effect
[N of reg.]
(SE)
(1)
(2)

Control Treatment
mean
effect
[N of reg.]
(SE)
(3)
(4)

Control Treatment
mean
effect
[N of reg.]
(SE)
(5)
(6)

Panel A. Knowledge about incentives for working more years
1. SS a better deal if working
0.363
0.043*
more years
[1,536]
(0.025)

2. Aware that SS benefits are based on
some number of years with the
highest earnings

0.364
[1,528]

0.079**
(0.034)

0.385
[688]

0.009
(0.038)

0.167

0.378
[842]

0.074**
(0.034)

0.347
[686]

0.037
(0.037)

0.458

Panel B. Knowledge about incentives for claiming later
3. SS increases for a typical worker
0.906
0.012
for delaying claiming between
[1,572]
(0.014)
ages 62 and 66

0.888
[873]

0.020
(0.021)

0.928
[699]

0.004
(0.020)

0.566

4. SS increases for a typical worker
for delaying claiming between
ages 66 and 70

0.803
[1,572]

0.023
(0.019)

0.788
[873]

−0.005
(0.028)

0.823
[699]

0.056**
(0.026)

0.112

5. SS remains the same for a typical
worker for delaying claiming
between ages 70 and 74

0.367
[1,572]

−0.013
(0.024)

0.360
[873]

−0.012
(0.033)

0.375
[699]

−0.012
(0.037)

0.999

Panel C. Expected future claiming behavior
6. R’s point estimate of the expected
65.5
or realized SS claim age
[1,307]
(if not claiming in 2008)

7. The mean of R’s pdf of the expected
or realized SS claim age
(if not claiming in 2008)

65.5
[1,203]

0.055**
(0.025)

0.346
[848]

p-value
on t-test
of
difference
(7)

0.07
(0.13)

65.6
[698]

−0.15
(0.20)

65.4
[609]

0.33*
(0.18)

0.069*

0.08
(0.11)

65.5
[647]

−0.11
(0.15)

65.5
[556]

0.34**
(0.15)

0.037**

Notes: Robust standard errors between parentheses. Number of observations in the regression sample in square brackets. The entire
sample consists of 1,595 observations (883 females, 712 males), but some regressions may have smaller samples because of item
nonresponse. Rows 6 and 7 have a smaller sample because the question was only asked of the relevant subsample of respondents.
Treatment effects are estimated by an OLS regression with controls for age and age squared as well as demographics measured at the
time of the baseline survey. See the note to Table 2 for a description of these demographic control variables. See online Appendix C
for the exact wording of the questions that define the outcome variables. Panel A: Q3.3 combined with Q3.1 and Q5.1, respectively.
Panel B: Q4.2. Panel C: Q1.8 and Q1.33, respectively. Column 7 reports the p-value on the test of the hypothesis that treatment
effects are equal for females and males. Percentage increases in Social Security per year of delay in claiming benefits are measured
as a percentage of benefits at age 66, and are top and bottom coded at +/− 25 percent. Note that this table only reports selected
treatment effects. The complete set of treatment effects on knowledge variables are in online Appendix Table A3 and the complete
set of treatment effects on planned or expected outcomes are in online Appendix Table A4.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

a better deal by 7.9 percentage points from a base of 34.6 percent ( p-value: 0.019),
though we cannot reject that the effect is the same for female and male respondents.
This pattern dovetails with the pattern that we found for labor supply responses:
much larger point estimates on the female labor supply response to our intervention
than on the male labor supply response, although we cannot reject that the response
is the same for females and males.22
We also ask respondents a multiple choice question about which years of earnings
determine one’s Social Security benefits. In line with results in our earlier paper,
just under 40 percent of individuals in the control group are aware that the benefits
22
An alternative explanation of why our intervention did not change perceptions of the increase in benefits from
additional years of work but did change perceptions about Social Security being a good deal could be that it increased
perceived life expectancy. However, we do not find any impact of the intervention on the perception of life expectancy.
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are based on their X highest years of earnings.23 The second row of Table 5 shows
that the information intervention significantly raises the fraction of respondents that
answers that benefits are based on years with highest earnings by 5.5 percentage
points. Again, the point estimates are substantially larger for female respondents, for
whom the effect is 7.4 percentage points and statistically significant, although we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect for men and women is the same.
When we examine knowledge about incentives for claiming benefits at a later
date, we find that over 90 percent of respondents know that benefits increase when
a worker delays claiming between the ages of 62 and 66, and over 80 percent know
that benefits increase when claiming is delayed between the ages of 66 and 70.24
The mean perceived increase in benefits per year of delayed claiming as a percentage of benefits at age 66 is quite accurate for the 62–66 age range (perception of
7.1 percent versus actual value of 6.25 percent), is too low for the 66–70 age range
(perception of 3.1 percent versus actual value of 8.0 percent), and too high for the
70–74 age range (perception of 3.4 percent versus actual value of 0 percent). The
information treatment had no significant effects on these responses for the sample as
a whole, though it increased the fraction of male respondents that perceive a positive
return for delaying claiming between the ages of 66 and 70 by a statistically significant 5.6 percentage points. Similarly, the information treatment has a positive and
statistically significant effect on male respondents’ perceptions of the percentage
increase in benefits per year of delayed claiming in the same 66-to-70 age range (see
online Appendix Table A3).25
Table 5 and online Appendix Table A3 show that the information intervention did
not lead to large and significant shifts in average responses for many of our knowledge
questions. We therefore want to be careful not to overinterpret the significant effects
that we do find. Nevertheless, we believe that, taken as a whole, the estimates of treatment effects on knowledge suggest three points. First, to the extent we find significant
effects, these effects all indicate an increased awareness of the benefits of working longer and claiming later. This finding suggests that at least part of the behavioral labor
supply response may have occurred through a higher perceived return to working
more years. Second, the treatment had an especially large and significant effect on the
perceived incentive for women to work more years, which matches our earlier finding that the labor supply response was especially strong among female respondents.
Third, the information intervention has a significant effect on men’s perceptions of the
return to delaying claiming between the ages of 66 and 70, which, as we will see in
Section IVB below, dovetails with the increase in planned Social Security claim ages
among male respondents. While these results are suggestive of a pathway in which
23
While 36 percent of controls are aware that Social Security benefits are based on the years with the highest
earnings, very few know that the correct number of years is 35. The median answer is 9 years and only 7 percent
give the correct answer of 35.
24
See Liebman and Luttmer (2011) for details on how these variables are measured.
25
It is interesting to speculate about why our intervention did not affect actual Social Security claiming behavior
given that claiming behavior is arguably the place where people’s decisions most deviate from what the standard
economic model says they should do. It may simply be that teaching people that Social Security is a valuable real
annuity and that they should buy more of it by claiming later is a more difficult concept to communicate than “you
may live a long time, so don’t stop working too early.” It would be interesting to design a follow-up intervention
that focused more specifically on educating people about this issue.
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the intervention affected behavior by changing perceptions of incentives, we cannot
rule out the possibility that the “gestalt” of the information intervention was partly or
fully responsible for the observed responses in realized and planned behavior.
B. Treatment Effects on Planned or Expected Behavior
Because little more than one year elapsed between the administration of the
information intervention and the collection of the follow-up data, the time span
during which respondents could possibly change their behavior in response to the
new information was limited.26 In an attempt to capture effects of the information
intervention on future behavior, we also asked the respondents a number of questions about their planned future behavior. Specifically, we asked them about their
expected retirement age, likelihood of continuing to work after starting to collect
Social Security benefits, and expected date of claiming Social Security benefits. We
think of these responses as more speculative than our responses on current behavior
because the planned behavior measures are likely to be less reliable (cheap talk)
and more noisy (respondents might not yet have firm plans or have thought future
decisions through) than realized behavior.
Overall, the information intervention had no significant effects on planned or
expected outcomes. We suspect that this lack of statistically significant findings is
partly due to the fact that expectations are not measured as precisely as realized
outcomes. The one exception to the lack of statistically significant findings is that
the information intervention increased the expected claim age among male respondents, as shown in panel C of Table 5. While we do not want to give too much
credence to one significant finding out of multiple outcome variables, we note that
this change in expected behavior matches our earlier finding that the information
intervention increased the perceived return to delaying claiming among men. We
take this correspondence between changes in perceived incentives and changes in
expected behavior as an indication that the intervention may have worked at least
partly through changing perceptions of incentives. The full results on planned and
expected outcomes are discussed in Liebman and Luttmer (2011) and available in
online Appendix Table A4.
C. Why Do Behavioral Impacts Seem to Be Concentrated among Females?
The labor supply impacts in Table 3 are especially pronounced for female sample
members, raising the question of why this is so. However, despite the intriguing difference in the point estimates between the female and male labor supply response,
we noted that we cannot reject that the responses are the same in magnitude. Given
that the difference in labor supply responses is not even statistically significant
itself, we generally do not have sufficient statistical power to convincingly determine the mechanism behind this difference because explorations into the mechanism involve examining subsamples of our data or further interaction terms. Hence,
26
Delaying the administration of the follow-up survey beyond one year would have had the drawback of
increasing attrition from the panel.
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our explanations of the intriguing male-female differences in the point estimates of
the labor supply response can be only suggestive.
Male and female sample members were equally likely to recall the intervention,
ruling out different exposure to the treatment as an explanation. One dimension,
however, along which men and women have a striking difference is the length of
their work history. Only 8.7 percent of the men in our sample have a work history
of less than 35 years, whereas this figure is 36.5 percent for women. The returns to
working an additional year drop sharply after 35 years of earnings because at that
point an additional year of earnings generally replaces an earlier year of earnings
(rather than a 0) when calculating the PIA, which is based on the 35 highest years of
indexed earnings. Thus, women are four times more likely than men to have a year
of additional earnings count fully in the determination of their PIA. This finding
implies that a better understanding of the 35-year rule would have an impact on the
perceived returns to working additional years that is stronger for women than for
men. Table 5 demonstrated that our intervention significantly increased knowledge
of the 35-year rule, both in the entire sample as well as in the subsample of women.
Thus, it is possible that the increased understanding of the 35-year rule in combination with the higher fraction of women with a work history less than 35 years caused
a disproportionate increase among women in the perceived return to working longer.
If the differences in work history were responsible for the stronger treatment effects
on perceived work incentives and on actual labor force participation for women, we
would expect the treatment effects to be concentrated among females with a work
history of fewer than 35 years. This indeed appears to be the case. The treatment effect
on perceived labor supply incentives, as measured by the “better deal” question, is
0.119 (s.e. 0.064) for women with a work history less than 35 years but only 0.033
(s.e. 0.046) for those with a work history of 35 years or more. Though this difference
is not statistically significant (p-value 0.203), the size and sign of the difference offer
some suggestive support for the notion that the gender difference in treatment effects
can traced in part to differences in work history. Similarly, we would expect the treatment effect on labor force participation to be concentrated among women with a work
history of fewer than 35 years. This also appears to be the case. The treatment effect
on labor force participation is 0.099 (s.e. 0.056) for women with less than 35 years of
work but is 0.057 (s.e. 0.041) for those with a longer work history. While the difference in treatment effects is again not statistically significant (p-value 0.560), its sign
and size are suggestive of a role of gender differences in earnings histories as part of
the explanation for the stronger treatment effects on women.
However, the difference in career lengths is unlikely to be the entire story. The point
estimate of labor supply response of women with 35 years of work is still much larger
than that for men (though it is not significantly different from zero). Moreover, the
intervention did not change the fraction of women who expected to receive benefits on
their own records (83 percent). Thus, another interpretation is that women as a whole
have gotten a particular message about Social Security based on the historical experience of typical women—and that this has rubbed off even on women who worked
for 35 years or more. In particular, some women in our sample may have believed
that as secondary earners, they get little or no marginal Social Security benefits from
additional work. This would have been true for most women who retired twenty or
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thirty years ago, but for women today who are working into their 60s, we estimate
that 70 percent or more are receiving benefits based on their own earnings record.27
Both the information and gestalt of our intervention may have countered the historical
message that Social Security’s work incentives are weaker for women.
V. Conclusion

The field experiment described in this paper demonstrates that a relatively mild
informational intervention can have important impacts on the labor force participation of older individuals. In particular, we find that our intervention increased labor
force participation in our sample by 4 percentage points. While we found a labor
supply response on average, we note that the provision of information can improve
decision making even if it does not change mean outcomes. In particular, if prior
perceptions of labor supply incentives were centered around the true values, better
knowledge could cause an equal number of people to increase and decrease their
retirement dates. Liebman and Luttmer (2012) find that for many features of Social
Security, median perceptions are quite close to the true values, even though there is
a wide spread around the median. Thus, it is possible that our intervention caused
more than 4 percent of our sample to change labor supply, but that our estimate only
picked up the net effect of increases and decreases in labor supply.
We also find that the intervention affected people’s perceptions of the returns to
remaining in the labor force and that both the labor supply impacts and the impacts
on perceptions were concentrated in the same population subgroups—suggesting
that the behavioral response may be attributable in part to updated perceptions of
incentives from Social Security. We do not, however, have a conclusive explanation
for why the labor supply impacts appear to be concentrated among female sample members. We speculate that the intervention may have countered perceptions
that women receive little or no additional Social Security benefits from incremental
labor effort, perceptions left over from an earlier era when most women received
benefits based on their husbands’ earnings records.
This study was designed to answer the threshold question of whether an easily scalable information intervention could alter behavior. The intervention therefore delivered information in several different mutually reinforcing ways. Before
drawing policy implications from this intervention and other similar interventions
in which information provision alters behavior, it will be important to learn more
about the mechanisms through which such interventions produce their effects. To
27

To generate a rough estimate of the share of women receiving benefits on their own record, we analyzed
SSA’s 2004 Benefit and Earnings Public-Use File. To mimic the characteristics of our sample, we identified recent
retirees who had been working when they were between the age of 60 and 65 and examined whether they were
receiving only retired worker benefits or whether they were also (or only) receiving benefits based on the record of a
current or former spouse. Specifically, we examined female Social Security beneficiaries who were between the age
of 66 and 71 in 2004 and who had positive labor earnings in 1998 (when their ages ranged from 60 to 65). In this
sample, 65 percent of the women were receiving benefits based only upon their own earnings record. However, this
cohort (born around 1935) was born about ten years earlier than our survey sample (born around 1945). Eckstein
and Lifshitz (2011) show that female labor force participation rates rose by more than 10 percentage points at
most ages between the 1935 and 1945 birth cohorts. Thus, it appears likely that the fraction in our sample who will
receive benefits on their own record exceeds 70 percent. Moreover, 83 percent of the female respondents report that
their benefits will be based only on their own earnings record.
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the extent that informational interventions affect behavior by educating sample
members and allowing them to make better choices, such interventions unambiguously raise sample member welfare. In contrast, if interventions have their impact
by delivering a general message such as “working to older ages is better,” then the
normative implications are more complicated since the message may or may not
be accurate for a particular sample member. Because our experimental mechanism
allows for complete researcher control over the message delivered to sample members, it would be straightforward to conduct a follow-up study that delivered only
subsets of the intervention so as to determine the relative importance of each form
of information as well as the existence of interaction effects from reinforcing the
message by providing information in multiple ways.
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